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THE GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE OF THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE
ENTITY

Yuri Biondi*

I. INTRODUCTION
During recent decades, economy and society have been framed by the rapid pace of financial
markets driven by new modes of management, governance and regulation. This transformation
towards financialisation may be summarised under the “shareholder value” label.1 What do
financial markets do? Unequivocally, they allow trading on shares in the form of financial
entitlements which are established by law and formalise expectations and claims to financial
rents.2 Actually, how continued quotation on the Share Exchange comes to be the barometer of
economic or societal well-being is more complicated. This has required quite a great leap from
“the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor” (Keynes 1936, 376), involving
changes in monetary and financial frameworks at policy-making and regulatory levels, changes
in banking and financial activities, and changes in shareholding and management of business
firms as well. The general trend has been further shaped by transnational imitation between
various socio-economic environments (Williams 2000 ed.; Deeg and Jackson 2007).
Moreover, the “shareholder value” revolution has implied new beliefs and ideas driving (i) a
peculiar understanding of what financial markets can actually do, together with (ii) a peculiar
understanding of what they indirectly are concerned with, that is, ongoing firms having internal
organisation and management.
The first point (i) relates to the efficient financial market rhetoric. Beyond its academic
foundations in the latest developments of neoclassical economic theory, this rhetoric has been
utilised by financial market-makers to socially construct their businesses and advertise their new
financial “products” to clients and citizens. Belief in the magic of the Share Exchange has been
fuelled, and firms have become the very commodity that trading is constructed upon. Financial
markets trade on legal entitlements, whose values relate -in principle- to financial performance
*

Yuri Biondi studied economics and social sciences (DES) at the Bocconi University of Milan (M.Sc.), and
economic analysis and history of institutions and organisations at the Lyon2 and Brescia Universities (PhD). In
France, he has taught at the universities of Lyon2, St. Etienne, and the CNAM (www.cnam.fr). He is currently
tenured researcher (research fellow) for the French Institute of Research (www.cnrs.fr) and affiliated professor of
corporate governance and social responsibility at the CNAM. He is the promoter and main editor of The Firm as an
Entity: Implications for Economics, Accounting, and Law (Routledge, 2007), and co-editor, with Tomo Suzuki, of
The Socio Economics of Accounting (Socio Economic Review, special issue, October 2007).
On 22 and 23 May 2008, he promoted and convened the Eaepe International Conference on “Governing the
Business Enterprise: Ownership, Institutions, Society” at the Cnam, Paris (http://eaepe.cnam.fr).
1
Froud et al. (2000) and Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) deal with the managerial foundations of shareholder value,
whilst Boyer (2000) and Aglietta and Reberioux (2005) provide insightful macroeconomic analyses. Clarke (2004)
edits a magisterial collection on theoretical foundations of corporate governance.
2
Together with shares, other sophisticated arrangements deal with the linkage of finance to socio-economic
activities, including financial instruments and securities, and insurance and pension schemes.
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and position of business firms.3 In order to exist in financial markets –that are nowadays
considered as the centre of economy and society–, firms are reduced to financial placements
(point ii). The peculiar market rhetoric already applied to financial markets is then replicated
within the firm. The firm is understood as a bundle of net financial investments made on behalf
of investors who trade on shares issued by the firm itself. In this way, shareholder value has led
to reshaping of businesses and a fostering of new “best practices” involving integrated financial
management (Williams 2000 ed.).
According to Karl Polanyi, classical and neoclassical economic theory and capitalism are
characterised by an alleged extension of “our obsolete market mentality” to every socioeconomic activity. Polanyi’s seminal work identified three “fallacious commodities”: land,
money, and human work. Even though the latter enter socio-economic activities and contexts in
significant ways, this does not imply either the existence of or the need for a market coordination
of those activities. The same reasoning may be applied to the firm nowadays. Expanding upon
Coriat & Weinstein (2008), “shareholder value” fallaciously reduces the firm to a commoditised
financial placement. The firm factually is a significant socio-economic activity, but this does not
imply that it is -or has to be understood as- a market. Moreover, even though trading exists on
shares and other legal entitlements issued by the firm, this does not imply that the whole
economy of the business firm does -or ought to- respond to that trading on a market basis.
This paper aims to address the theoretical problem with shareholder value that comes from its
underlying perspective on financial markets and share-holding. Shareholder value relies on the
efficient financial markets hypothesis. Investors are then considered as completely clear-sighted
traders adjusting promptly and without costs to price signals, “as if” the price system alone
framed and shaped the dynamic of both financial markets and the firm. But what happens when
shares - acquired at a definite price - relate to the enterprise congeries of legal and economic
systems involving flows and immobilisations that require an accounting system to explicate
them?
Recent crises and shortcomings testify against the received wisdom of financial markets, whose
magic become black (Clarke 2008). Instead of assuring ever-progressive developments in
economic and social well-being, they appear to raise unaddressed issues of stability and fairness.
Enterprises that were glorified by advocates of shareholder value, like Enron or the Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities LLC, have generated unexpected and huge fraudulent losses. The
advertised miracle of the “new economy” becomes suddenly old, and encounters evergreen
troubles of sustainability, responsibility, and accountability. Mark-to-market accounting, claimed
to be fair value, is suddenly dismissed once market prices disruptively decrease and financial
markets experience systemic failures4. As many scholars have recently acknowledged, reforms
3

Issuances from governments and other entities are neglected here for sake of simplicity.
On 3 October 2008, the so-called 'Financial Institutions Bailout Bill' (Paulson Plan) included two sections (n° 132
and 133) relating to fair value (marked-to-market) accounting, the first giving authority to the SEC to suspend this
method of accounting for reasons of public interest and investors protection, the second mandating further studies
on: its effects on balance sheets of firms, impact on the quality of financial information, role on bank failures in
2008, process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in developing related accounting
standards, advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards, and alternative accounting standards to
those already in place concerning fair value. Analogous decisions were taken by EU authorities.
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are necessary, in order to protect shareholders as well as other stakeholders, but also
communities and nature at large.
Together with architectural and managerial changes, new beliefs and ideas were crucial in the
recent ascension of “shareholder value”. Remedying the current impasse, then, may require not
only careful exercises in policy-making, but also some theoretical changes. Received policies
and the whole concern with “corporate governance” and disclosure have been framed by a
limited understanding of what financial markets and firms are, can and ought to be. Therefore,
path-breaking analyses may be concerned with criticising received patterns of thought, in order
to provide a different understanding of financial markets and the firm. This paper engages this
theoretical provision by drawing upon the concept of the firm as an “enterprise entity”, which
has significant implications for governance and disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, the framework based on the concept of the
firm as an enterprise entity is summarised. Later, two alternative views on the firm, jointly
creating shareholder value rhetoric -namely the “black box” and the “proprietor entrepreneur”-,
are criticised as “daydreams”. Finally, this critique leads to significant implications for the
governance and disclosure of the firm as an enterprise entity.

4
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II. THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE ENTITY
Following Biondi (2005) and Biondi et al. (2007), the idea of the firm as an enterprise entity
implies a comprehensive approach that integrates economics, accounting, and law. This approach
comprehends the firm as a managed dynamic system (Figure 1) jointly constituted by two basic
relationship: the enterprise core that denotes the management of an economic organisation
mediated by an accounting system; and its governance that makes management accountable to
various stakeholders for enterprise income and results.
Entity's income
and results
Accounting System

Enterprise
Core
Management

Enterprise
Governance
Other interactions

Organisation
Undertakers (Stakeholders)
Figure 1 - The Firm as an Enterprise Entity
This functional system of the firm is further characterized by different “structures of production”
(in Coase, 1992’s words): institutional, organizational or epistemic (respectively related to the
place and role of institutions, internal organization, and knowledge within the firm). The concept
of the enterprise entity aims to frame together these institutional, organizational, and epistemic
(cognitive) dimensions of the business enterprise.
Theoretically speaking, the entity approach to the firm reacts to a “sense of lacking” in the
current state of socio-economic theory and practice. Notwithstanding its theoretical and heuristic
advances, a market bias can be recognised in economic and sociologic approaches to business
activities. Received understandings of socio-economic dynamics appear to excessively focus a
distinctive individualistic vein. They neglect therefore the special socio-economics of institutions
and organisations that frame and shape business activity of the firm. Nevertheless, these limited
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views have been influential on actual business practices and institutional frameworks that have
been advocated and applied in recent decades. Whereas, the enterprise entity approach enters the
field by developing insightful suggestions from: H. Simon, who addresses the special economic
organisation of the firm as a dynamic system; M. Shubik, who deals with the relationship
between accounting and the critique of equilibrium economics (neoclassical) of the firm; R.
Coase, who explores the accounting contribution of accounting to the theory of the firm; and
A.A. Berle Jr., who criticises the classical view of the proprietor entrepreneur under the
economic and financial conditions that characterize(d) the 20th century. In addition, the
enterprise entity perspective takes inspiration from some traditions of thought (from economics,
accounting, and law) that have already tried to understand the business firm and its impact upon
economy and society: especially the continental European tradition of accounting and
economics, and the old American, and European, institutional economics.5 Together, these
perspectives offer some backgrounds for the view of the firm as an entity, a whole, a dynamic
system. In particular, such a view integrates law and economics with accounting under the
comprehensive notion of the firm as an “enterprise entity” that is already common to all three
scholarly and professional communities. According to this approach, the firm is then:
a) Understood as an enterprise entity,
b) Characterized by a peculiar economic and monetary process (dynamic system), which
c) Generates income to the firm,
d) Whilst is confronted with the actual dynamics and complexity of socio-economic reality
(unfolding and undetermined).
The entity approach has consequences and implications for the system of governance and
disclosure. Accordingly, the accounting system is an integral part of the firm’s system of
management, governance and regulation, a part that demonstrates the joint implications of
economic, accounting, and legal matters within the firm. In a business affair fraught with
unfolding changes coupled with asymmetries of resources, access, control and information, the
accounting system copes with the economic and monetary process generated by the whole
enterprise, and defines the representation of its capital (assets and liabilities) and income
(revenues and costs). In this way, the accounting system allows this special process to exist and
function autonomously from and interactively with share-holding and trading. It lies therefore at
the core of the continuity and sustainability of the enterprise entity, and mediates immanent
conflicts of interests among various stakeholders, including shareholders.
This comprehensive understanding of the firm contrasts with the shareholder value rhetoric that
frames the firm with either financial markets and/or ownership claims. The first frame reduces
the whole firm to a “black box,” whilst the second frame submits it to a lonely “proprietor
entrepreneur.” The following section will provide a comparative analysis of these three
approaches to the special economics of the business firm.

5

References to recent advances will be provided in the following.
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III. BEHIND SHAREHOLDER VALUE RHETORIC
The view of the firm as an enterprise entity contrasts with two alternative views, which jointly
compose the “shareholder value” rhetoric. The first view aims to make the firm entirely
dependent on external markets, whilst the second view purports to submit it to legal ownership
rights (Table 1).
Table 1 - Three distinctive views of the firm
Enterprise entity
Black Box
Concept

A complex dynamic
system or whole

Functioning A specific economic
and monetary process

Purpose

Conditions

Generation of income
to the firm, related to
the satisfaction of
individual and social
needs
Under actual dynamics
and complexity of
socio-economic reality
(unfolding
and
undetermined)

Proprietor
Entrepreneur
A shallow nexus of Ownership and wealth
(market) prices or
(complete) contracts
A mechanical link A legal and economic
between price and cost device for the solitary
for
each
product owner
separately (marginal
cost pricing)
A unique objective of A unique objective of
“profit maximisation” generation of rents
from wealth
Under
idealised Under ideal conditions
conditions abstracted of
complete
away from hazard and contracting
and
context
enforcement

A. DAYDREAMING THE FIRM AS A “BLACK BOX”
Some endorsers of shareholder value more or less explicitly refer to the conception of the firm as
a “black box”. This view relates to the neoclassical economic theory that understands the firm on
a market basis. The inner intricacies of the business are made “black,” since only external market
prices for inputs (including fictitious commodities such as land, money, and human work) and
outputs matter in the market economics of the firm. In fact, the history of economic thought
sheds some light into the box. Accordingly, the firm no longer appears to be empty or black,
because this market view of the firm provides a peculiar understanding based upon:
a) A shallow nexus of (market) prices or (complete) contracts, characterised by
b) A mechanical link between price and cost for each product separately (marginal cost pricing),
and
c) A unique objective of “profit maximisation” - a profit that shall be null, like in the
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punishment of Tantalus,
d) Under idealised conditions abstracted away from time, hazard and interaction.
In a sense, the firm as such disappears in this market framework, replaced by a system of
efficient market pricing. The whole firm no longer has an impact on economy and society. If its
managers disclose information about their activity and the business incomes generated, they
discharge their responsibility towards markets which they must follow. Markets (especially the
Share Exchange) are then the cutting edge for the economics of the firm.

B. DAYDREAMING THE FIRM AS A “PROPRIETOR ENTREPRENEUR”
Some advocates of shareholder value have another daydream, which understands the firm as a
legal-economic device of its “proprietor entrepreneur”.6 This time, the firm disappears in favour
of the lonely captain of his own business. This capitalistic hero alone bears the risks, and alone
undertakes the management of the enterprise. The firm and its personnel are nothing but his
instruments, playing no role in decision-making, organisation, or control, since all that does
matter is the solitary owner of the firm. This approach understands the firm as:
a) A form of ownership and wealth, characterised as
b) A legal and economic device for the solitary owner,
c) With a unique objective of generating rents from that wealth,
d) Under ideal conditions of complete contracting and perfect enforcement.
Once again, the firm as such disappears in this ownership framework, replaced by a system of
enforceable ownership rights. Again, the whole firm has no impact on economy and society. If
its managers disclose information about their activity and the business incomes generated, they
discharge their responsibility towards the owner whom they must obey. Ownership is then the
cutting edge for the economics of the firm under this approach.

C. THE PROBLEMS WITH DAYDREAMS DRIVEN BY SHAREHOLDER VALUE
However influential and significant these daydreams are, they involve problems that go beyond
the emotional (and political) reactions for or against them. These views grapple with the reality
of business firms as they exist and function in economy and society. For instance, firms combine
a number of corporate and other legal arrangements (including contracts and regulations
concerned with labour, financial security, foods & drugs, environment, anti-trust), which
collectively create the triple separation of ownership, control and management (not only between
6

Reference is made here on such individualist assumption since the presence of several proprietors entrepreneurs
would integrate an interactional holistic dimension that this approach aims to exclude, see also Hirshleifer (1987).
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ownership and control), already recognised by Berle and Means’ seminal work. In order to cope
with this legal-economic web, management does not rely exclusively on market pricing, but
maintains accounting systems that are modes of looking inside the ongoing enterprise process,
i.e., to know, organise and govern that process.
Both the “proprietor entrepreneur” and the “black box” viewpoints grapple with this special legal
and accounting field generated by the enduring economy of the business firm. In particular, law
and accounting provide evidence for the functional distinction between the firm and its
“owners”. The legal structure of the firm involves various legal forms (including corporations)
that hold and possess the assets, enter into contracts and obligations, and have priority rights in
flows, incomes and results. Furthermore, through the working of the accounting system,
prudential regulation restricts dividend payments and equity repayments from the firm to
shareholders or partners, whilst fiscal regulation establishes the income tax based on the net
accounting earnings for the period.7 Therefore, ownership by isolated individuals is framed and
shaped by a “phantom” entity that the idea of a “solitary owner” cannot cope with.8
The “black box” representation does not capture the entity phantom. This is because the latter
view assumes that the price system (the market) is sufficient to understand, organise and regulate
the business activity of firms. The firm would be neutral, and institutions would not matter.
Accordingly, no business inflows and outflows would exist but (efficient) market prices.
Unfortunately, the firm (and its dynamics) does matter in the economic and monetary process. It
generates an epistemic, organisational and institutional field that has a distinctive impact on the
process of generation of incomes that all stakeholders are interested in (Sunder 2008). Once
again, the working of the accounting system provides the legal-economic basis for this
theoretical claim. For the accounting system defines revenues and costs of the period though
accruals and other technicalities that encompass the monetary dimension. Contrary to the “black
box” view, the firm is not a simple “nexus of monetary flows (prices)”, since the accounting
system goes beyond the cash basis through its definition and application of “accruals”.
Moreover, prior financial literature has argued for the influence of taxation and dividend policies
on shareholder value (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Gordon 1959; Lintner 1956). As a matter of
fact, the accounting representation constitutes the basis of taxation and dividends’ distribution.
This accounting basis is not a market basis; rather it allows the accounting system to both
establish net earnings (that may be partly or fully distributed to shareholders or partners), and to
determine the tax basis, as well as the maintenance of prudential ratios, executive compensation,
and so on. More generally speaking, the working of the accounting system provides a common
representation of business capital and income to the firm (Biondi 2005 and 2008 for further
details). The accounting system copes with the special process of becoming by accounting for the
firm as an entity. Such enterprise process is concerned with uncertainties, bounded knowledge,
potential and actual mistakes, and mis-organisation. It is then unfolding and undetermined.
Confronted with this process, the accounting system becomes a special mode of representing,
7

Avi-Yonah (2008) discusses the legal-economic foundations of taxation under different conceptions of the
business firm. See also Kleven, Kreimer and Saez (2009).
8
The legal debate on the nature of public corporation deals with this problem involved by focusing on individual
entrepreneurship and ownership. The notion of enterprise entity aims to go further by understanding the legal
structure of the firm as a system of multiple arrangements including corporations (Strasser and Blumberg 2008,
Berle 1947).
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organising, and regulating the ongoing economic organisation and its becoming. It deals with
price formation, carried immobilizations (investments), overhead allocation, and all the concerns
which lay at the core of everyday business activity trough time, space, and interaction.
In conclusion, the firm and its accounting system do not constitute a mere “nexus of market
prices”, and the accounting system becomes a constitutive part of the “institutional structure of
production,” which can no longer be reduced to “ownership rights” alone. This leads to an
understanding of the firm as an enterprise entity characterised by its management, organisation
and accounting system, which jointly play an active role in the economic and monetary process
of creating and allocating resources (production and distribution of wealth), with accounting
mapping and mediating the business processes that link organisation and management into the
enterprise field through hazard, learning, and interaction. This role has significant implications
for governance and disclosure, which will be discussed by the following section.

IV. GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE OF THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE
ENTITY
Notwithstanding the mentioned factual problems with the market and the ownership view, we are
ever free of the thinking that firms should be dominated by either markets or owners. This has
been the main attitude for the last three decades of corporate governance and regulation, and it is
the basis for convergence among conceptual frameworks for financial reporting fostered by
American and International accounting standards-setting bodies (Bignon et al. 2004; Biondi and
Suzuki 2007). As Jensen (1983, p. 320a) candidly argues, “in the end, of course, we are all
interested in normative questions; a desire to understand how to accomplish goals motivates our
interest in methodological topics and in positive theories.”
The Friedman’s “what if” argument might be further advocated as a defence of this normative
attitude. However, whilst a theory is obviously concerned with what is and should be, it also
concerns what can be. Therefore, it ultimately provides an overall understanding of facts and
potentials. Whether it has some predictive power or not, the overall understanding that a theory
provides is fundamental whenever recommendations are expected. Otherwise, poor policies may
result for economy and society.
Regarding shareholder value rhetoric, recent crises and scandals provide evidence for the limited
understanding of this framework (Clarke 2008). The theoretical choice of neglecting the firm as
such has eventually transformed the firm in an unaddressed field of overwhelming power.
Advocates of shareholder value have been concerned with public (Governmental) powers
(Shleifer 1998, Mattei and Nader 2008, 42 ff.), but private (financial) powers may also raise
constitutional economic and societal concerns. As a consequence of such narrowed frame of
analysis, the firm as a phantom has been haunting the socio-economic realm. Headlines reporting
massive shortcomings have revealed how powerful this phantom can be.

10
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Contrary to the voluntary myopia advanced by advocates of shareholder value, the view of the
firm as an enterprise entity takes the firm seriously. Pursuant to this view, governance and
regulation of businesses upgrade from the logic of ownership and financial markets to
accountability9. The firm as such no longer disappears from economy and society, rather it plays
an active role in the process of creation and allocation of resources. If managers disclose
information about the business activity and the business income generated, they would then
provide information about the results that have been generated by the enterprise entity under
their fiduciary responsibility, and accounted for by the accounting system. The management of
the enterprise entity becomes the cutting edge for the economics of the firm under this approach,
with significant implications for enterprise governance and disclosure.

A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENTERPRISE ENTITY VIEW FOR GOVERNANCE AND
DISCLOSURE

The received view of governance and financial disclosure is driven by the rhetoric of shareholder
value (Biondi and Chambost 2008; Biondi and Rebérioux 2008), which in turn relies on efficient
financial markets and shareholder ownership of the firm. The “institutional structure of
production” is then expected to comply with this framework by making operational (and
enforceable) the shareholders’ claims on governance and disclosure. However, even if coupled
with financial market trading, ownership alone cannot grasp the whole institutional structure
(system) of production. This structure is concerned with sustainability, accountability and
responsibility within the special field of the ongoing business firm. Accounting systems factually
comprehend this structure and therefore become a special mode for making the firm accountable.
Accounting may then be understood as a mode of representing, organizing and regulating the
socio-economic system of the business firm and its institutional, organizational, and cognitive
patterns and interactions. Even in the absence of the disciplines of market and ownership,
accounting and accountability assume an active role in governing and regulating management
and the organized activities of the enterprise entity as a whole.
In turn, the firm itself may be recognised as a special field fraught with unfolding changes
coupled with asymmetries of resources, access, control and knowledge among different
stakeholders and the management. The field of the firm implies interactional holistic concerns
that cannot be addressed at the individual or the contractual level. In particular, price formation,
carried immobilizations, overheads allocation are distinctive features of this field through time
and time.
In a world of pure law, every business activity is controlled ex ante by external forces driven by
immediately enforceable rules and contractual claims. A striking analogy exists with the world of
perfect and complete markets, where prices suffice to secure the socio-economic interests for
each stakeholder linked to the business. Every business activity is controlled ex ante by external
9

As a matter of fact, these logics play simultaneously in the actual field of the business firm, and constitute dynamic
sources of tensions, conflicts, and transformations in a way. Here, we are arguing for a preference or hierarchy
between them as focus and principle of reference.
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forces driven by the price mechanism and monetary incentives. In contrast, in a world of
complex organizations concerned with unfolding changes and bounded rationality, every
ongoing entity involves a financial-economic core existing beneath the chrysalis provided by
contracts and prices. Within this core, contracts are necessarily incomplete, and markets are
never perfect. In the void left by incompleteness and market failures, the firm acquires a dynamic
and collective dimension that leads to a field of power (Sakatera and Sawabe 2000; Biondi et al.
2007). As Berle early recognized, legalistic reasoning cannot deal with this power, because the
formal conformity to rules may hide unfair behavior, fraud and abuses. This situation is at the
very origin of the legal-economic meaning of the expression “equitable interest,” that is, a
legitimate interest that the bearer might be unable to defend through contractual enforcement of
rights and claims.10 The institutional process of protection (comprising governance and
regulation) fills the void so as to address the “equitable interests” of stakeholders relying on the
firm for the joint accomplishment of goals, but substantially, even though not formally, because
they lack the contractual enforcement or market outward options. This protection requires a
combination of principles and devices involving discretion and judgment. Principles lie at the
core of that process, since they provide each actor (especially management and law court judges)
with a clue to comprehending the socio-economic dynamics of the common concern and to
undertaking a “fair” conduct of business. This conduct is “fair” because it takes into account
“other people interests”11 and thus has regard for the public interest at large. Fairness cannot be
narrowly reduced to economic values, but ultimately ethical guidelines drive the choice and
application of principles of reference for the social responsibility of business.
In this context, the institutional structure of the firm (including its accounting system) enters into
the firm’s field as an accountability device for sustainability and responsibility of the joint
business affair. Consequently, the enterprise entity view has five primary implications:
1) The entity should be understood as a “joint and becoming concern”, autonomous from
stakeholders (including shareholders)12;
2) There is triple separation between ownership, and control, and management;
3) The impact of “absentee ownership” (and the difference between the legal and economic
frontiers) must be considered;
4) The specific role played by the accounting system in the enterprise process;
5) The articulation between this enterprise process and the value (and valuation) of equity
shares.
For matters of governance and disclosure, the enterprise entity constitutes a joint and becoming
concern (point 1). Some legal and economic features define the firm’s economic autonomy and
10

Montagne (2006, 46 ff.) deals with the emergence of the notion of “equity” and “equitable interest” in trust
regulation.
11
According to Adam Smith, the management of the affairs of a public company is concerned with “other people's
money”, and this may eventually lead to negligence and profusion.
12
This concept expands upon the notion of “going concern” that Commons had distilled from legal-economic
practices as theoretical keystone of his institutional economics. The latter notion was utilised by early accounting
entity theorists at least until the middle war period.
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continuity beyond mere legal forms. In particular, shareholders have limited financial
responsibility and benefit from an unconstrained right of “exit,” whilst prior legal protection is
granted to other stakeholders against shareholders in some cases. Moreover, through its legal
structure (comprising companies and mandates and other legal forms and devices), the entity
acquires legal capacity to enter contracts and obligations, hold autonomous (collective) property
and possess assets, and have priority in controlling cash flows, incomes and results.
These features suffice to separate shareholders from the corporation that has issued their shares,
and they distinguish the corporation from the whole business enterprise (see also Segrestin and
Hatchuel 2008). As analysed by Strasser and Blumberg (2008), enterprise groups feature the
financial structure and reinforce this separation. All this implies the separation between, on the
one hand, shareholding, and, on the other hand, management (namely possession). Only the
management is entitled to dispose of assets and cash flows and to organise the activity of the
enterprise (point 2). This further implies the special status of managerial power that requires an
institutional process of control in order to frame and supervise that power. Therefore, the notion
of “absentee ownership” (Veblen) is critical (point 3). It means that a large number of
shareholders hold only a small part each of the shareholders equity value, and are excluded from
actual decision-making, whilst influential insiders (including significant minority shareholders,
investment funds and financial intermediaries) can control the firm at a distance, by influencing
executive managerial decision-making and the fabric of the rules-making (Aglietta & Rebérioux
2005; Froud and Williams 2007).
Theoretically speaking, legal forms -related to corporate frontiers- are distinct from the socioeconomic frontiers of the firm, that is, the economic substance of the business enterprise. This is
the primary reason that accountants looked beyond legal forms in order to accounting for the
business enterprise on a more appropriate basis (point 4). In turn, this implies the separation
between the accounting system and the value of equity shares (point 5). Instead of reporting
about the firm as a proprietary placement, modern accounting systems are structured to provide
relevant and reliable representations connected with institutional regulations regarding dividend
payments and repayments of shareholders’ equity, and related to retention of net earnings as
sources of « financing » (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000). This accounting separation is further
related to the fact that, before liquidation, the enterprise entity does not have to repay shares at
their value (either market or accounting value), since shareholders must sell them through the
Share Exchange in order to recover their investment. This way, the institutional structure of the
firm acts as a shield that locks-in financial resources which have been provided to the firm and
are required for the continuity of the enterprise through time (Blair and Stout 1999).

B. THE ENTERPRISE ENTITY AND SHAREHOLDERS’ CLAIMS
Taking into account the working of the firm as an enterprise entity may radically change the
relationship of the firm with potential and actual shareholders, especially in relation to matters of
governance and disclosure. According to the (narrow) definition of Shleifer and Vishny (1997,
737), “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment,” this return being either a market return
(capital gains between buying and selling prices), or a comprehensive return including dividends.
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However, the market value is external to the enterprise process (according to point 5 above), and
the distribution of dividends is residual and constrained by net earnings and other figures
accounted for by the accounting system (point 4 above). Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the
enterprise entity, shareholders equity is a special source of financing, as Schumpeter – translated
and commented by Biondi (2008) – early advocated. Accordingly, the accounting system may
recognise the shareholders’ claim on the business incomes generated by the enterprise entity as a
cost and an allocation.
This mode of remuneration of shareholders relates to the understanding of both the status and
role of shareholding and its relationship to the firm as an enterprise entity. Several accounting
techniques are available for recognising this remuneration: for example, by defining a
“shareholders’ equity interest” (Anthony) based on the actual financial funds provided in the
past, or by settling the shareholders’ share (interest) of the overall net earnings (as the German
law does). This differs from the definition of shareholder value provided by “Economic Value
Added” (EVA©, a trademark deposed by Stern Stewarts, a consultancy firm) and other marketbased metrics (Froud et al. 2000). Technically speaking, all these metrics are variants of
discounted present value based on prospective cash flows to shareholders. In particular, EVA©
may be formalised as follows:
EVA = (ROE – k) * Shareholders’ Equity = Net Earnings – k * Shareholders’ Equity
Where ROE is the usual “Return On Equity” (the ratio of Net Earnings on Cumulated
Shareholders’ Equity, including reserves)13, and k is the estimated market cost of shareholder
capital. This definition of shareholder value implies that the whole “residual income” (if
positive) should be allocated to shareholders.
In contrast, the “shareholders’ equity interest” (SEI) may be formalised as follows14:
SEI = i * Cumulated Shareholders’ Funds
Where i represents the cost of shareholders’ funding (agreed by management, directors,
shareholders’ meeting, statutes, by-laws, financial contracting or other institutional
arrangements) as a source of financing, and the “cumulated shareholders’ funds” implies the
separation between the funds committed by shareholders (including undistributed past SEIs) and
the entity equity, mainly composed by cumulated net earnings after SEIs (Anthony 2003;
Staubus 1959). This definition of shareholder remuneration implies that only a part of the whole
residual income may be allocated to shareholders, the remainder being available for reinvestment
or donation.
More generally speaking, the EVA metrics fits the fair value accounting perspective that reflects
the shareholder value drift in accounting regulation, whilst the shareholders’ equity interest (SEI)
improves on traditional accounting systems based on historical cost and revenue generated by the
13
14

Financial analysis sometimes estimates shareholders equity at its market value.
An alternative formulation is available as share of net earnings.
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firm through time. Shareholder value replaces the nominal financial capital maintenance by a
new concept that includes the maintenance of the opportunity cost and defines shareholder equity
in
terms
of
capacity
to
earn
the
current
market
rate
of
return
15
. Moreover, shareholder value is at odds with justifying supplementary accounting systems for
environmental and societal issues, since the social responsibility of business is anything but
profits as usual (echoing the Friedman’s adage) under this approach. On the contrary, the
enterprise entity approach may easily integrate a more comprehensive approach to accountability
of business affairs. Examples of voluntary disclosure regarding this matter already exist
worldwide, and some regulations make it compulsory in France and Germany, since 2002.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, a new institutional approach is required to better understand the firm as an
institution and an organization having a distinctive impact on economy and society. This
perspective implies a new inter-disciplinary approach that links economics, accounting and law
by a unique common notion: the firm as an enterprise entity (Biondi et al. 2007). This theoretical
development is original, but is not isolated in the current debate. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy
speak about the management of off-contractual relations to understand the socio-economic core
of the firm, whilst Rajan and Zingales are concerned with the integrity of this core against the
“dark side of the ownership”. Especially Blair and Stout claim for the autonomy and continuity
of the legal-economic entity framing various stakeholders, including shareholders, and inscribe
this point in a constructive critique of financial market efficiency (Stout 2003 and 2005).
The enterprise entity view understands the firm as a whole, a dynamic system of relationships,
not only contractual or bargaining. From this perspective, order and disorder, efficiency and
waste, honesty and guile, development or distress have much to do with the structures of such
relations (more than what existing theories have already recognized). In particular, this
comprehensive view provides valuable insights to better understand (i) the inner economic nature
of the firm, (ii) the separation between ownership, management, and control, and (iii) the related
systems of enterprise governance and disclosure.

15

IASC (1997, Chap. 6, §2.4-2.7) suggested this conception for financial assets and liabilities.
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